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A
nalysts often use financial variables to help
predict real activity and inflation. Financial
variables offer readily accessible informa-
tion and, because market participants base their
investment decisions on their forecasts of real
activity and inflation, the information in finan-
cial market variables is deemed to be reliable.
One of the most popular financial market vari-
ables is the spread between yields on long-term
and short-term government instruments, also
known as the yield spread. This article examines
the predictive power of the yield spread for real
growth and inflation in a collection of industri-
alized countries.
Researchers have shown that the spread is a
good predictor of real activity, and its predictive
power also has been recognized beyond academic
research circles. For instance, the Conference
Board uses the yield spread in constructing its
Index of Leading Indicators. In the previous
issue of this Economic Review, Bonser-Neal and
Morley found that the spread helps predict real
activity over the next year, the next two years,
and the next three years. One aim of this article
is to extend the analysis of Bonser-Neal and
Morley, examining in greater detail the horizons
at which the yield spread helps predict real
growth and investigating whether information
on the level of yields contains additional predic-
tive power beyond that summarized by the spread.
Although evidence on the yield spread’s pre-
dictive power for real activity is robust, evidence
on its predictive power for inflation is weaker.
Most studies have analyzed this relationship
within a very restrictive framework, and there is
only limited evidence on the predictive power
over intermediate horizons of a few years and
for countries other than the United States. A
second aim of this article is to add to the existing
literature by examining a broader collection of
countries than has previously been analyzed and
a wider array of forecast horizons. In addition,
restrictions imposed in earlier studies are relaxed.
For real activity, this article finds that the
predictive power of the yield spread largely
derives from its usefulness over the horizons of
a year or so and generally dominates the predic-
tive power associated with the level of yields.
For inflation, this article finds that, although the
yield spread helps predict inflation at moderate
horizons of a few years, the level of yields is a
more useful predictor of inflation.
Sharon Kozicki is a senior economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Barak Hoffman, a research
associate at the bank, helped prepare the article.The first section of the article summarizes
various theories that may explain why the spread
has predictive power. The second section dis-
cusses the empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between the spread and real growth, while
the third section discusses the results for infla-
tion. The closing section suggests why the
spread may be more useful for predicting real
growth than inflation, while the level of yields
may be more useful for predicting inflation than
real growth.
I. WHAT IS THE YIELD SPREAD?
To understand why the yield spread is a poten-
tially useful indicator of future economic activity
and inflation, it is important to understand what
the yield spread represents. This section intro-
duces the yield curve and the yield spread and
discusses why the yield spread and the level of
the yield curve may predict real activity and
inflation.
1
The yield curve and the yield spread
The yield on a government bond is the annual
rate of return, or interest rate, that would be
earned by an investor who holds the bond until
it matures. Time-until-maturity, or maturity, of
a bond is an important feature of a bond because
yields differ with maturity. To understand why,
consider how investors would behave if they
expected one-year interest rates to be higher next
year than this year. Investors would demand a
higher annual return for holding a two-year bond
than for a one-year bond, causing the two-year
yield to be higher than the one-year yield. 
The  yield curve describes the relationship
between yields and maturities. Yield curve infor-
mation is published daily by the financial press.
The shape and level of the yield curve change
daily as investors reassess current and expected
future economic conditions. Two sample yield
curves are plotted in Chart 1. The blue line
shows the yield curve for September 8, 1993,
and the black line shows the yield curve for
September 8, 1997. Although both curves have
similar shapes, with a rather rapid rise over the
first five or ten years of maturity followed by
a relatively flat section over the latter years of
maturity, some important differences are evident.
First, the levels of the two yield curves differ.
The curve dated September 8, 1997 is sub-
stantially higher than the curve dated September
8, 1993. Second, the changes in yields observed
with changes in maturity differ for the yield
curves. As maturity increases from three
months to ten years, yields on the curve dated
September 8, 1997 increase by about 1-1/4 per-
centage points whereas yields on the curve dated
September 8, 1993 increase by over two per-
centage points.
The yield spread is the difference between
yields on two different debt securities. The yield
spread also provides information on the slope of
the yield curve. The larger the spread is between
a long-term and short-term bond, the steeper the
slope of the yield curve will be.
2 The yield curve
was steeper on September 8, 1993, than on Sep-
tember 8, 1997, with the spread between 10-year
and 3-month yields equal to 2.54 percentage
points on September 8, 1993, and 1.31 percent-
age points on September 8, 1997 (Chart 1).
Why might the yield spread help predict
real growth and inflation?
Analysts look to the yield spread as a potential
source of information about future economic
conditions. Several hypotheses argue that the
information in the yield curve is forward-looking
and therefore should have predictive power for
real growth and inflation. Three such hypothe-
ses of the predictive power of the spread are
outlined below. 
40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThe yield spread reflects the stance of mone-
tary policy. According to this view, a low yield
spread reflects relatively tight monetary policy
and a high yield spread reflects relatively loose
monetary policy. This interpretation is based on
an economic theory which equates long-term
yields with a risk or term premium plus a
weighted average of expected future short-term
yields. Because they reflect what market partici-
pants expect short-term yields will average over
a relatively long time interval, long-term yields
are a reasonable benchmark against which cur-
rent short-term yields can be compared. Thus,
when current short-term yields are high relative
to long-term yields, so the yield spread is low,
this view holds that the current stance of mone-
tary policy is relatively tight. 
Bonser-Neal and Morley offered a second expla-
nation why the yield spread may reflect the
stance of monetary policy. Short-term yields
move closely with the interest rate that serves as
an instrument of monetary policy (i.e., the federal
funds rate in the United States). When monetary
policy is tightened, short-term interest rates
rise. Although long-term yields may react to
policy, they rarely rise one-for-one with short-
term interest rate increases. As a result, the yield


























ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 41Under this hypothesis, the yield spread helps
predict real growth and inflation because it
reflects the current stance of monetary policy
and economic variables respond to monetary
policy actions. Accordingly, a low spread pre-
dicts that in response to the relatively tight
stance of monetary policy, real activity will slow
and inflation will decrease. Conversely, a large
spread predicts that in response to relatively
accommodative monetary policy, real growth
will pick up and inflation will increase.
The yield spread contains information on credit
market conditions. Long-term yields reflect equi-
librium between supply and demand conditions
in credit markets. Long-term yields are deter-
mined in financial markets and, although they
may react to policy shifts, they also may change
in the absence of an explicit shift in monetary
policy. Thus, although much of the variation in
the yield spread is due to policy-driven shifts in
short-term yields, the spread also changes with
shifts in long-term yields. 
The most common version of the credit mar-
ket theory predicts that an increase in the spread
caused by an increase in long-term yields will
precede stronger real growth and higher infla-
tion. This prediction is based on the assumption
that the rise in long-term yields is caused by an
increased demand for credit. An increase in the
demand for credit likely portends a pickup in
economic activity as credit financing facilitates
increased investment and personal consumption
expenditures.
3 
The yield spread reflects the direction of
future inflation changes. This hypothesis
stresses the links between the yield curve and
expected inflation. When long-horizon expecta-
tions of inflation change, long-term interest
rates change. For instance, improved credibility
of monetary policy may result in lower expected
future inflation, lower long-term yields, and a
lower spread. Under this view, a decrease in the
spread will predict a decrease in inflation if
investors’ forecasts are on average correct. 
Why might the level of the yield curve help
predict real growth and inflation?
In addition to the spread, the level of the yield
curve may also provide useful information for
helping predict real growth and inflation. Since
overall demand for and supply of credit are
reflected in the general level of interest rates
across the maturity spectrum, this information
may provide predictive information in addition
to that summarized by the yield spread. The
yield spread does not contain information on the
general level of interest rates because it is con-
structed as the difference between two rates. Not
only was the yield spread higher on September
8, 1993, than on September 9, 1997, but the level
of the yield curve was lower on the earlier date
(Chart 1).
The level of the yield curve as measured by
short rates might help predict real growth and
inflation because short rates may provide informa-
tion on the stance of monetary policy. Short-term
interest rates move closely with the interest rate
that serves as an instrument of monetary policy.
While fluctuations in the yield spread may reflect
shifts in policy, they may also be caused by shifts
in risk premium. Thus, the level of short rates
may provide a better measure of the stance of
monetary policy than the yield spread.
II. PREDICTING REAL GROWTH
WITH THE YIELD SPREAD
This section examines how effectively the
yield spread helps predict real growth. Numer-
ous studies have established that the spread
helps forecast real activity in the United States.
(Stock and Watson; Harvey; Estrella and Har-
douvelis; Estrella and Mishkin; Dueker). A few
42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYstudies have examined whether yield spreads
also help predict real economic activity in other
countries (Plosser and Rouwenhorst; Bonser-
Neal and Morley).
4 This article extends the
analyses of these studies. 
The relationship between real GDP growth
and the yield spread, constructed as the differ-
ence between the yield on a 10-year bond and a
3-month bill, is examined for Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, the UK, and the United States.
5 Two
issues are investigated. First, at what horizon
does the yield spread best aid in predicting real
growth? Second, does the level of the yield
curve matter?
At what horizons does the yield spread
best aid in predicting real growth?
Bonser-Neal and Morley established that the
spread has predictive power for real growth over
the next year, the next two years, and the next
three years. They found, however, that the per-
cent of growth variation explained by the spread
drops as the interval over which growth is fore-
cast increases. Given this result, it is natural to
ask if the predictive power of the spread for
average growth over the next two or three years
comes largely from its ability to predict growth
over the next year. The analysis in this section
focuses on this question.
The following equation is estimated for each
country:
GDP growtht+h-4,t+h = a + b ´ spreadt 
+ d ´ GDP growtht-4,t + errort, (1)
where GDP growtht+h-4,t+h is real GDP growth
over the four quarters beginning in quarter t+h-4
and ending in quarter t+h, spreadt is the yield
spread in quarter t, GDP growtht-4,t is real GDP
growth over the four quarters beginning in quarter
t-4 and ending in quarter t, errort is the prediction
error in quarter t, and h is the forecast horizon in
quarters.
6 To determine whether the spread helps
predict growth over the next year, h is set to four
quarters. To determine whether the spread helps
predict growth for the year after the next year, i.e.,
in two years, h is set to eight quarters. To deter-
mine whether the spread helps predict growth in
three years, h is set to 12 quarters. Because a
simplistic forecast of real growth might be based
on current real rates of growth, the current real
growth rate is included in the estimated equation.
7
Thus, estimation results will assess whether the
spread provides additional information beyond
that contained in current growth rates.
8
Table 1 summarizes estimation results obtained
using data over 1970 to 1996.
9 Estimates of the
coefficient on the spread, b, that appear in bold-
face are significantly different from zero at 5
percent.
10 Table entries in rows labeled R
2 report
the percent of the variation in real GDP growth
that is explained by the explanatory variables in
equation (1). To determine how much expla-
natory power is due exclusively to the spread,
an equation including only a constant and cur-
rent real growth as explanatory variables also
was estimated. The percent of the variation in
real GDP growth that is explained by a con-




between entries in rows labeled R
2 and entries
in rows labeled R
2 no spread reflects the predic-
tive power of the spread. For example, at a four-
quarter horizon, 47 percent of the variation in
real GDP growth in Canada can be explained by
the yield spread.
12
In general, the spread is found to be both
statistically and economically significant as a
predictor of real GDP growth. Estimates of the
coefficient on the spread, b, in equation (1) are
positive and statistically significant at a four-
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THE YIELD SPREAD AS A PREDICTOR OF FOUR-QUARTER 
REAL GDP GROWTH
Country
Horizon of forecast 
(Quarters)
4 8 12













 -0   






 51   





 1   
-1  






 26   













 30   













 28   













 6   













 10   













 14   






 -1   






 21   













 39   
 -0   
.45





Note: Boldface entries are statistically significant compared with 5 percent critical values.
44 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYquarter horizon for nine out of the ten countries
examined. Only for Japan was the estimate of
b statistically indistinguishable from zero. In the
remaining nine countries the spread helps pre-
dict real GDP growth, explaining between 10
and 47 percent of the variation in real GDP
growth. The spread is also an economically sig-
nificant predictor of real GDP growth. All else
equal, a 100-basis-point reduction in the U.S.
yield spread would lead to a 0.99 percentage
point reduction in predicted U.S. real GDP
growth for the coming year. Although growth
predictions are most sensitive to shifts in the
spread in the United States, growth predic-
tions are somewhat sensitive to the spread, even
in Sweden, the country with the smallest sig-
nificant estimate of b. In Sweden, a 100-basis-
point reduction in the yield spread would
reduce predicted real growth by about 0.3 per-
centage point.
The spread has maximum predictive power
for real GDP growth over the next year, i.e., at a
horizon of four quarters. This result follows
from the observation that the maximal contribu-
tion of the spread occurs at a four-quarter horizon.
In fact, the predictive power of the spread for
real growth falls rapidly as the forecast horizon
increases. When trying to predict real growth for
the year after next (i.e, at an eight-quarter fore-
cast horizon), the number of countries for which
the spread significantly helps predict real
growth falls from nine to three. When the fore-
cast horizon is increased by another year, to 12
quarters, the spread ceases to be statistically
significant in any of the ten countries examined.
These results suggest that the finding of Bonser-
Neal and Morley, that the spread helps predict
real growth over one-year, two-year, and three-
year intervals in the future, is largely driven by
the strong predictive power of the spread for
growth over the first year.
13 
Chart 2 shows that the U.S. yield spread has
often been a good indicator of U.S. real GDP
growth over the next year or so. Since 1955,
every recession (indicated in the chart by shaded
bars) has been preceded by a period in which the
yield spread has fallen considerably below its
historical average. Nevertheless, low spreads
were not always followed by significant economic
slowdowns. For example, the low spread observed
in late 1995 was not followed by a significant
decline in real economic growth (box).
Although the spread holds predictive power
for near-term real growth, it is natural to ask
whether any additional information from the
yield curve would help improve predictions for
real growth. The level of the yield curve seems
a likely candidate. 
Does the level of the yield curve matter?
The first step in assessing whether the level of
the yield curve matters is to decide how to
measure the level of the yield curve. Any one
yield on the yield curve, such as a 3-month rate
or a 10-year rate, could serve as a measure of the
yield curve. However, yield curves typically
present the relationship between nominal yields
and maturities, and nominal yields, which contain
both real rate and expected inflation compo-
nents, are less relevant for economic activity
than real rates. For this reason, a real yield was
chosen to be a better measure of the level of the
yield curve.
Real yields, while more relevant for economic
decisions, are not directly observable. Typically,
real yields are approximated as the difference
between observed nominal yields and a proxy
for expected inflation. Because it becomes more
difficult to build reasonable proxies for expected
inflation over longer horizons, an estimate of a
short-term real rate was used to measure the
level of the yield curve. The short-term real rate
was estimated as the difference between the
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 45short rate used in construction of the yield
spread (a 3-month rate) and inflation over the
previous four quarters.
14
The following equation is estimated for each
country:
GDP growtht+h-4,t+h = a + b ´ spreadt
 + g ´ spreadt ´ realratet + q ´ realratet 
+ d ´ GDP growtht-4,t + errort, (2)
where, in comparison with equation (1), two addi-
tional explanatory variables have been included:
real ratet is the short-term real rate in quarter t
and spreadt  ´ real ratet is equal to the product of
the spread in quarter t and the short-term real rate
in quarter t. Direct predictions of the spread are
measured by b. Direct predictions of the real rate
are measured by q. Indirect predictions, which
account for interactions between the spread and
the real rate are measured by g.
15 Interactions
would be important if a change in the spread has
different implications for real growth predictions
depending on the level of the real rate. For exam-
ple, if the interaction coefficient g is equal to -0.2,
then if the spread falls by one percentage point,
the change in the prediction for real growth will
depend on the level of the real rate, even if the real
rate does not change. The prediction for real
growth would fall by 1.6 percentage points if the
real rate is 3 percent, but only by 1.2 percentage
points if the real rate is 1 percent. 
Chart 2
THE YIELD SPREAD AND REAL GDP GROWTH
United States
Notes: Annual growth rates are calculated over the previous four quarters. Shaded bars are NBER-dated recessions.
















1955 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965
Growth
Spread
46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYEstimation results suggest that the spread
continues to be a statistically and economically
significant predictor of real growth over the
next year when the level of the yield curve and
interactions between the level and spread are
included in the predictions equations (Table 2).
Estimates of the coefficient on the spread, b,
remain positive and statistically and economi-
cally significant in all countries where the
spread was also found to be statistically signifi-
cant from estimation of equation (1). 
In addition, estimation results suggest that, in
general, given the yield spread, the level of the
yield curve does not matter. The estimated coef-
ficient on the level of real short-term interest
rates, q, is insignificantly different from zero in
six of the ten countries examined. In two coun-
tries, Sweden and the UK, estimates of q are
positive and significant, but in two other coun-
tries, Canada and Italy, estimates of q are negative
and significant.
16 Estimates of g are insignifi-
cantly different from zero in eight of the ten
countries examined. Only in Italy and the UK
does the predictive power of the spread depend
significantly on the level of short-term real rates
and, although significant, the coefficient for the
UK is of a sufficiently small magnitude that the
results do not appear economically significant.
The evidence presented in this section sug-
gests that the spread contains information
about future real growth beyond information
about current monetary policy. If all of the pre-
Table 2
THE YIELD SPREAD AND THE LEVEL OF THE YIELD CURVE 
AS PREDICTORS OF FOUR-QUARTER REAL GDP GROWTH









Australia .33 .01 .04 12 -0
Canada .55 .02 -.22 55 4
France .57 -.03 -.04 27 5
Germany .76 -.02 .08 29 2
Italy .71 -.10 -.36 43 2
Japan .15 .03 -.03 5 6
Sweden .49 .03 .18 16 0
Switzerland 1.06 -.11 .57 23 4
United Kingdom .99 -.04 .41 36 3
United States .96 -.01 -.11 39 -0
Note: Boldface entries are statistically significant compared with 5 percent critical values.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 47dictive power of the spread came from current
monetary policy as reflected by fluctuations
in short rates, then the spread would likely not
have continued to be a useful predictor of real
growth when the level of real rates also was
added to the regression equation. These results
do not, however, rule out the possibility that
some of the predictive power of the spread
comes from its role as an indicator of the stance
of monetary policy. Thus, both the hypothesis
that the spread represents the stance of monetary
policy and the hypothesis that the spread con-




This section examines whether the yield
spread helps predict inflation. While studies
have broadly agreed that the yield spread helps
predict near-term real activity, empirical results
relating inflation predictions to the yield spread
are weaker. For the few countries that have been
examined, the evidence suggests that the yield
spread may contain information about inflation
changes over moderate horizons (Fama;
Mishkin 1990 and 1991; Jorion and Mishkin;
Blough; Frankel and Lown; Abken).
17
The analyses of previous studies are extended in
several ways. First, the predictive power of the
spread for inflation is investigated for a larger
collection of countries and forecast horizons
than has been previously analyzed. Second, the
analysis does not impose restrictions on the
forecast horizon based on the maturities of the
yields used in constructing the spread. Relaxing
these restrictions enabled extending the analysis
to a larger collection of countries than pre-
viously studied.
The structure of this section follows that of the
previous section, first investigating the horizon
at which the yield spread best aids in forecasting
inflation, then investigating whether informa-
tion on the level of the yield curve helps predict
inflation. This parallel structure provides for
contrasting the results for inflation with those
for real growth.
At what horizons does the yield spread
best aid in predicting inflation?
The following equation is estimated using data
over 1970-96 for Australia, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK, and the United States: 
inflationt+h-4,t+h = a + b ´ spreadt
+ d ´ inflationt-4,t + errort, (3)
where inflationt+h-4,t+h is price inflation over the
four quarters beginning in quarter t+h-4 and end-
ing in quarter t+h, spreadt is the yield spread in
quarter t, inflationt-4,t is price inflation over the
four quarters beginning in quarter t-4 and ending
in quarter t, errort is the prediction error in quarter
t, and h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
18 The
current rate of inflation is included as an explana-
tory variable because hypotheses of the predictive
power of the spread propose that the spread pre-
dicts the changes in inflation relative to current
inflation. 
Estimation results suggest that the spread
helps predict inflation two to four years in the
future (Table 3).
19 In direct contrast to the growth
results, the predictive power of the spread for
inflation tends to increase with forecast horizon
before, in some countries, subsiding.
20 The aver-
age contribution of the spread rises from 1.4
percent at a horizon of four quarters to 7, 12, and
15 percent respectively at horizons of 8, 12, and
16 quarters.
21 
In general, the spread is both a statistically and
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THE YIELD SPREAD AS A PREDICTOR OF FOUR-QUARTER INFLATION
Horizon of forecast (Quarters)
Country 4 8 12 16
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Note: Boldface entries are statistically significant compared with 5 percent critical values.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 49economically significant predictor of inflation.
The spread explains between 1 percent (for
France) and 33 percent (for Sweden) of the
variation in inflation at a four-year horizon (i.e.,
over the year ending four years in the future). At
this horizon, estimates of the coefficient on the
spread, b, in equation (3) are positive and statis-
tically significant for six of the ten countries
examined. In addition to being statistically sig-
nificant, the spread is an economically signifi-
cant predictor inflation. For example, all else
equal, a 100-basis-point decrease in the UK
yield spread would lead to a 1.26 percentage
point reduction in predicted UK inflation at a
four-year horizon. 
Thus, the empirical analysis has found sub-
stantial evidence that the yield spread helps
predict inflation, but the results for inflation are
different than those for real growth. The results
for inflation are less strong than those for real
growth as the coefficient on the spread is signifi-
cant in fewer countries in estimated inflation
equations than in estimated real growth equa-
tions. Also, the spread helps predict inflation at
longer horizons than real growth. 
 In the previous section, the empirical evi-
dence suggested that when forecasting real
growth, information on the level of the yield
curve did not matter given the yield spread. Does
the level of the yield curve matter for inflation
forecasting? 
Does the level of the yield curve matter?
Paralleling the analysis followed for real
growth, the following equation is estimated for
each country: 
inflationt+h-4,t+h = a + b ´ spreadt
+ g ´ spreadt ´ realratet + q ´ realratet 
+ d ´ inflationt-4,t + errort , (4)
where, in comparison with equation (3), real ratet
and spreadt ´ real ratet have been added as ex-
planatory variables. The short-term real rate is
used as a measure of the level of the yield curve
as in the previous section. Coefficient estimates
of q will be significantly different from zero if the
level of the yield curve has predictive power
independent of the yield spread.
22As discussed
earlier, coefficient estimates of g will be signifi-
cantly different from zero if interactions between
the spread and the real rate are important.
Estimation results suggest that the predictive
power of the spread for inflation largely disap-
pears when information on the level of the yield
curve is included in the analysis (Table 4). This
result is robust across other forecast horizons,
although Table 4 only reports results for a 16-
quarter horizon. Estimates of the coefficient on
the spread, b, are insignificant in eight of the ten
countries and, contrary to the predictions of the
hypotheses discussed above, negative and sig-
nificant in the remaining two countries. But, in
nine of the ten countries examined, estimates of
the coefficient on the level of the yield curve,
q, are negative and statistically significant. Also,
in three countries, Germany, Italy, and Japan, the
estimates of g are negative and significant.
Overall, these results suggest that the level of
the yield curve holds more information about
future inflation than the yield spread, opposite
to the findings for real growth reported in the
previous section.
The level of the yield curve, as measured by
the short rate, contains considerably more infor-
mation about future inflation than the spread.
Not only does the spread lose statistical signifi-
cance when the short-term real rate is added, but
the percent of inflation variation explained by
yield curve information rises. The percent of
inflation variation explained by yield curve infor-
mation rose on average over the ten countries by
about 22 percentage points when information on
50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthe level of the yield curve was included (Tables
3 and 4). Thus, the real rate is particularly rele-
vant for forecasting future inflation. 
Chart 3 shows U.S. inflation and the U.S.
short-term real rate. The short-term rate does
seem to provide information on the future direc-
tion of inflation changes. Negative short-term
real rates in the mid-1970s were followed by a
large increase in inflation in the late 1970s. High
short-term real rates in the early to mid-
1980s were followed by declining inflation.
Relatively high short-term real rates around 1990
were followed by falling inflation in the early to
mid-1990s. 
One explanation for the strong predictive
power of the short rate for inflation is that this
variable provides a cleaner measure of the
stance of monetary policy than the yield spread.
If inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon
in the long run, then better measures of the
stance of monetary policy might be expected to
be better predictors of future inflation at moder-
ate or long horizons. Although the yield spread
may contain information on the current stance
of monetary policy, the spread also likely con-
tains information on credit market conditions.
By contrast the short rate moves very closely
with monetary policy actions.
23
IV. SUMMARY
This article investigated the predictive power
of the spread for real growth and inflation in a
collection of industrialized countries. Two results
Table 4
THE YIELD SPREAD AND THE LEVEL OF THE YIELD CURVE 
AS PREDICTORS OF FOUR-QUARTER INFLATION









Australia -.37 -.03 -.79 40 0
Canada -.42 .02 -.85 53 4
France -1.15 .04 -1.68 69 19
Germany -.69 -.13 -.98 28 0
Italy .35 -.16 -1.32 71 6
Japan -.33 -.24 -1.26 25 10
Sweden -.23 .02 -.71 48 1
Switzerland .61 .04 .33 23 21
United Kingdom -.72 .08 -1.95 55 4
United States -.17 -.01 -.53 29 4
Note: Boldface entries are statistically significant compared with 5 percent critical values.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 51are robust across the countries. First, the
spread has maximum predictive power for real
growth over the next year or so, whereas maxi-
mum predictive power for inflation is at a much
longer horizon of about three years. Because
analysts typically expect prices to respond with
a lag to conditions of excess demand or excess
supply in product markets, this result is not
surprising. 
The second result is that the spread matters
most for predicting real growth whereas the
level of short rates matters most for inflation.
One interpretation of this result is that the short
rate provides a cleaner measure of the stance of
monetary policy than the spread, in part because
the spread also contains information on credit
market conditions. Under this interpretation, the
short rate is a better predictor of inflation over
moderate horizons because inflation is primarily
a monetary phenomenon in the long run. Both
the stance of monetary policy and credit market
conditions, however, are important for near-
term growth.
Chart 3
THE SHORT-TERM REAL INTEREST RATE AND INFLATION
United States
Notes: Annual growth rates are calculated over the previous four quarters. Short-term real interest rates are calculated as the 
3-month rate less inflation.
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The 1995 low-spread episode in the
United States is an interesting case study
because it was followed by neither a reces-
sion nor a real growth slowdown. This box
compares low-spread episodes in the United
States. Because the yield spread changes
over time with changes in either short rates
or long rates, a natural question to ask is
whether it matters if a shift in the spread can
be attributed largely to changing short rates
or changing long rates. In other words, when
the spread falls to a relatively low level, do
economic predictions depend on whether
the fall in the spread was caused by rising
short rates or falling long rates?
Chart I-1 presents the level of the spread
and the preceding four-quarter change in
long rates and short rates for ten low-spread
episodes in the United States since 1955.
The dates in the chart represent the quarter
when the spread was at its lowest point.
Seven of the low-spread episodes preceded
recessions and an additional two—in 1966
and 1986—preceded real growth slow-
downs. Only one episode, the fourth quarter
of 1995, was followed by neither a recession
nor a real slowdown.
The evidence suggests that recent interest
rate history is very important for identifying
when a low spread foreshadows a slowing
of real activity. All U.S. recessions since
1955 were preceded by low spreads largely
caused by increasing short rates. In Chart I-1
this is reflected by dark bars (representing
short rate changes) that are taller than light-
shaded bars (representing long-rate changes).
Estrella and Mishkin noted that “restrictive
monetary policy probably induced the
1973-75, 1980, and 1981-82 recessions, but
it played a much smaller role in the 1990-91
recession.” Interestingly, the low spread that
preceded the 1990-91 recession was as
much caused by a falling long rate as it was
by a rising short rate. In fact, this was the
only recession for which a falling long rate
preceded a low spread.
Thus, one explanation of why the 1995
low-spread episode was followed by neither
a recession nor a real growth slowdown is
that the low spread was due exclusively to
falling long rates. In fact, the most recent
three episodes of relatively low spreads, in
1986, 1989, and 1995, differ from the earlier
episodes because the low spread was pri-
marily caused by falling long rates. And, a
recession followed only one of these three
low spreads.
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† Followed by a recession
* Followed by slower real growth
Notes: Long-rate and short-rate changes are over the previous four quarters.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and author’s calculations.
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1 Bonser-Neal and Morley present a similar overview.
2 The yield on a short-term instrument is often referred to
as the short-term interest rate, or short rate, and the yield
on a long-term instrument as the long-term interest rate, or
long rate. In this article, the short rate refers to the yield on
a 3-month government security (or a close substitute) and
the long rate refers to the yield on a 10-year government
bond (or a close substitute).
3 A less common version of the credit market theory
predicts that an increase in the spread caused by an increase
in long-term yields will precede weaker real growth. This
prediction is based on the premise that long-term yields
may rise with a decreased supply of credit. The availability
of credit may decrease, for example, with political
uncertainty, a decrease in the credibility of monetary
policy, or announcements or events that lead suppliers of
credit to expect that a near-term recession is more likely.
4 Harvey examines whether the spread between 5-year
bond yields and 3-month Treasury bill rates helps predict
real U.S. GDP growth over the next five quarters. Estrella
and Hardouvelis extend the available evidence for U.S.
data, reporting in-sample and out-of-sample evidence that
the yield spread helps predict real economic activity:
consumption (nondurables plus services), consumer
durables, and investment. They also examine whether the
spread provides information on the probability of an
upcoming recession. Estrella and Mishkin provide
out-of-sample evidence that the yield spread dominates
other financial variables when modeling the probability of
a U.S. recession. In an analysis of Germany, the United
States, and the United Kingdom, Plosser and Rouwenhorst
find that the long end of the term structure has information
about future growth of industrial production beyond
expectations of monetary policy. Bonser-Neal and Morley
conclude that the yield spread is a statistically and
economically significant predictor of real economic
activity over one-year, two-year, and three-year horizons
in several countries besides the United States. They present
in-sample and out-of-sample results for several indicators
of real activity in 11 countries.
5 The author is grateful to Catherine Bonser-Neal and
Timothy Morley for generously providing the data used in
their study. Real GDP growth is growth over the previous
four quarters. The yield spread is the quarterly average of
the spread. In countries where a 10-year government bond
is not actively traded, the data on the actively traded
long-term government bond closest in maturity to ten years
were used. For some countries, data on a 3-month rate such
as the rate on interbank deposits was used when data for a
3-month government bill rate was not available.
6 Bonser-Neal and Morely estimated equations of the
following form:
GDP growtht,t+k = a + b ´ spreadt + errort,
where GDP growtht,t+k is real GDP growth over the k
quarters beginning in quarter t and ending in quarter t+k,
spreadt is the yield spread in quarter t,  errort is the
prediction error in quarter t, and k is the forecast horizon
in quarters. For a 12-quarter forecast horizon, for example,
Bonser-Neal and Morley investigated whether the spread
helped predict average annual growth over the next 12
quarters, whereas the analysis in this paper asks whether
the spread helps predict annual growth over the final four
quarters of the 12-quarter forecast horizon.
7 By including current real growth as an explanatory
variable, the analysis can distinguish the hypothesis that
the spread helps predict the real growth rate from the
hypothesis that the spread helps predict whether the real
growth rate will rise or fall from the current real growth
rate.
8 Empirical results for GDP growtht+h-2,t+h defined as
growth over the two quarters ending in quarter t+h and for
additional horizons, h, of two, six, and ten quarters were
similar to those reported in Table 1.
9 This sample period was chosen because it was the longest
interval over which a reasonably complete data set was
available for all ten countries. In actuality, estimations for
Italy included one year less data at the start of the sample,
and estimations for Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland
only included data through 1994:Q4, 1995:Q3, and
1995:Q4, respectively. The analysis was repeated for
Germany using only pre-unification data, but results were
not qualitatively different. 
10 Boldface entries are statistically significant compared
with asymptotic 5 percent critical values. Estimated
standard errors were corrected for heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation following the procedure recommended
by Newey and West (1987) with the Newey and West
(1994) automatic lag selection routine.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 5511 Table entries in rows labeled R2 and R2 no spread are
adjusted for degrees of freedom.
12  For this example, the percent of the variation in real
GDP growth explained by the spread is estimated as 51
percent (the R2 for equation (1)) minus 4 percent (the R2
for equation (1) without the spread), which equals 47
percent.
13 Bonser-Neal and Morley included results from an
out-of-sample analysis of the predictive power of the
spread for real activity. Results, not included in this article,
from an out-of-sample analysis of real growth predictions
were largely consistent with the findings of Bonser-Neal
and Morley. For most countries, root mean squared errors
of out-of-sample forecasts were smaller for prediction
equations that included the yield spread than for equations
that just included a constant and current real growth. In an
out-of-sample analysis of inflation predictions, root mean
squared errors of out-of-sample forecasts generally were
reduced by the addition of information on the level of the
yield curve or the yield spread. For both real growth
predictions and inflation predictions, often different
models were preferred over different out-of-sample
intervals, different forecast horizons, and different
countries.
14 Average inflation over the past four quarters is
frequently used as a proxy for short-term expected
inflation. A four-quarter horizon was chosen over a shorter
horizon because the four-quarter average removes most of
the quarter-to-quarter fluctuations, generally regarded as
noise or temporary fluctuations, leaving a smoother series.
Variation in the smoother series is closer to that observed
in survey data on inflation expectations of consumers,
investors, and forecasters.
15 Equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
GDP growtht+h-4,t+h = a 
+ (b + g ´ real ratet) ´ spreadt 
+ q ´ real ratet + d ´ GDP growtht-4,t + errort,
so that the coefficient on the spread depends on the level
of the real rate. The predictions of a high spread for real
growth may depend, for instance, on whether the spread is
high because the risk premium is large or because monetary
policy is relatively accommodative. Since the real rate also
measures the stance of monetary policy, allowing the
coefficient on the spread to depend on the real rate may
differentiate between these two cases.
16 The positive significant estimates of q are surprising.
High short-term real rates are typically regarded as a signal
that monetary policy is relatively tight. In response to tight
monetary policy, real growth is expected to slow. In other
words, negative estimates of q are expected.
17 Most of the literature examines the ability of the spread
to forecast changes in inflation rather than the level of
inflation. Fama finds that the spread between a 5-year rate
and a 1-year rate forecasts changes in inflation. Mishkin
(1990) uses U.S. data to examine the predictive power of
short-maturity yield spreads for inflation differences at
matching horizons, limiting his analysis to horizons of up
to 12 months. Mishkin imposed “matching maturity”
restrictions by examining, for example, whether the spread
between 12-month and 6-month yields could help predict
the difference between the 12-month and 6-month inflation
rates. Mishkin (1991) extends his 1990 analysis to ten
OECD countries. Jorion and Mishkin examine data for
West Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S.
Although working over longer horizons—one to five
years—Mishkin and Jorion continue to impose matching
maturity restrictions. Blough conducts a similar study on
U.S. data at a slightly longer horizon, concentrating on
predictions of the change in the inflation rate the year after
next. Frankel and Lown relax the matching maturity
restrictions, but limit their analysis to predictions of the
difference between 12-month and 3-month inflation rates
in the United States. Abken summarizes past research.
18 Inflation rates for Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S.
were based on consumer price indexes obtained from the
International Financial Statistics database of the
International Monetary Fund. Inflation for the U.S. was
based on the deflator for personal consumption
expenditures. Using this measure of prices for the U.S.
avoids some of the inconsistencies that may be introduced
by a measure such as the CPI that has undergone major
upheavals in its construction across time.
19  As in the previous tables, coefficient estimates that
appear in boldface are significantly different from zero and
the difference between entries in the rows labeled R2 and
the rows labeled R2 no yield curve info reflects the
predictive power of the spread for inflation.
20 Empirical results for additional horizons of 6, 10, and
14 quarters were consistent with those reported in Table 3.
21 The average contribution of the spread was calculated
by averaging across the ten countries the difference
between the R2 and R2  no spread entries for a given
forecast horizon.
22 Although the equations contain the short-term real rate
56 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYas a measure of the level of the yield curve, it would be
inappropriate to conclude that it is the short-term real rate
and not the short-term nominal rate that matters for
predicting inflation. This is because the real rate is
constructed as the difference between the nominal rate and
inflation over the past four quarters, and inflation is also
included as a regressor in the estimated equation.
23 Monetary policy actions are often implemented through
shifts in a policy interest rate target. Historically, short-term
real rates are likely better measures of the stance of
monetary policy than short-term nominal rates. However,
because high-frequency fluctuations in interest rates on
instruments with short maturities largely reflect
fluctuations in real rates, nominal short rates also provide
information on monetary policy. This point follows from
the results of Mishkin. Mishkin found that for maturities
of six months or less, the yield curve contains almost no
information about the path of future inflation, but for the
shortest maturities contains information about the term
structure of real rates. In other words, at the shortest
maturities, fluctuations in nominal rates and real rates are
almost perfectly correlated.
REFERENCES
Abken, Peter A. 1993. “Inflation and the Yield Curve,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review,
May/June.
Blough, Stephen R. 1994. “Yield Curve Forecasts of Infla-
tion: A Cautionary Tale,” Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton, New England Economic Review, May/June.
Bonser-Neal, Catherine, and Timothy R. Morley. 1997.
“Does the Yield Spread Predict Real Economic Activity?
A Multicountry Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Economic Review, Third Quarter.
Dueker, Michael J. 1997. “Strengthening the Case for the
Yield Curve as a Predictor of U.S. Recessions,” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, March/April.
Estrella, Arturo, and Gikas A. Hardouvelis. 1991. “The
Term Structure as a Predictor of Real Economic Activ-
ity,” The Journal of Finance, June.
Estrella, Arturo, and Frederic S. Mishkin. 1996. “Predict-
ing U.S. Recessions: Financial Variables as Leading
Indicators,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, re-
search paper no. 9609, May.
Fama, Eugene F. 1990. “Term-Structure Forecasts of Inter-
est Rates, Inflation, and Real Returns,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, January.
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and Cara S. Lown. 1994. “An Indicator
of Future Inflation Extracted from the Steepness of the
Interest Rate Yield Curve along Its Entire Length,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May.
Harvey, Campbell R. 1989. “Forecasts of Economic
Growth from the Bond and Stock Markets,” Financial
Analysts Journal, September-October.
Jorion, Philippe, and Frederic Mishkin. 1991. “A Multi-
country Comparison of Term-Structure Forecasts at
Long Horizons,” Journal of Financial Economics,
March.
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1991. “A Multi-country Study of the
Information in the Shorter Maturity Term Structure
About Future Inflation,” Journal of International Money
and Finance, March.
       .  1990.  “What  Does  the  Term  Structure
Tell Us about Future Inflation?” Journal of Monetary
Economics, January.
Newey, Whitney K., and Kenneth D. West. 1994. “Auto-
matic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix Estimation,”
Review of Economic Studies, October.
       .  1987.  “A  Simple,  Positive  Semi-Definite,
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Co-
variance Matrix,” Econometrica, May.
Plosser, Charles I., and K. Geert Rouwenhorst. 1994. “In-
ternational Term Structures and Real Economic
Growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, February.
Stock, James, and Mark W. Watson. 1989. “New Indexes
of Coincident and Leading Indicators,” in O. Blanchard
and S. Fischer, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 351-93.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1997 57